{"title":"游戏的扩展形式","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813227361_0011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"! Repeated game example: Wage setting ! Extensive form of a game ! Information sets Example: Wage setting ! Stage game ! One firm, one worker ! The firm offers the worker a wage, w ! The worker accepts or rejects the firm's offer ! Reject: the worker becomes self-employed at wage w 0 ! Accept: Work (disutility e), or Shirk (disutility 0) ! If the worker works (supplies effort): Output is high=y ! If the worker shirks: Output is high with probability p, and low=0 with probability 1-p ! The firm does not observe the worker's effort decision ! The output of the worker is observed by both parties","PeriodicalId":435813,"journal":{"name":"A Course in Game Theory","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Extensive Form of a Game\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/9789813227361_0011\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"! Repeated game example: Wage setting ! Extensive form of a game ! Information sets Example: Wage setting ! Stage game ! One firm, one worker ! The firm offers the worker a wage, w ! The worker accepts or rejects the firm's offer ! Reject: the worker becomes self-employed at wage w 0 ! Accept: Work (disutility e), or Shirk (disutility 0) ! If the worker works (supplies effort): Output is high=y ! If the worker shirks: Output is high with probability p, and low=0 with probability 1-p ! The firm does not observe the worker's effort decision ! The output of the worker is observed by both parties\",\"PeriodicalId\":435813,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"A Course in Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"A Course in Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813227361_0011\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"A Course in Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813227361_0011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
! Repeated game example: Wage setting ! Extensive form of a game ! Information sets Example: Wage setting ! Stage game ! One firm, one worker ! The firm offers the worker a wage, w ! The worker accepts or rejects the firm's offer ! Reject: the worker becomes self-employed at wage w 0 ! Accept: Work (disutility e), or Shirk (disutility 0) ! If the worker works (supplies effort): Output is high=y ! If the worker shirks: Output is high with probability p, and low=0 with probability 1-p ! The firm does not observe the worker's effort decision ! The output of the worker is observed by both parties