董事会“独立性”会破坏公司价值吗?

P. Swan, David Forsberg
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引用次数: 12

摘要

澳大利亚证券交易所(ASX)的公司治理委员会(CGC)要求所有上市公司要么采用大多数与管理层或大股东没有联系的“独立”董事会成员,要么解释“如果没有,为什么没有”。尽管这接近全球标准,但它与美国交易所相反。美国交易所也要求“独立于管理层”,但明确表示,大量持股不必成为独立性的障碍。在固定公司和联合行业-年度效应的框架内,每个公司都与自己进行比较,我们表明,随着受影响的外部董事离开公司,为“独立董事”让路,公司绩效显著下降。普通Gray董事会做出更好的收购决策,增加CEO薪酬中激励的比例,并提高派息。董事会中高管人数增加会显著降低首席执行官的薪酬,而首席执行官和董事长的结合则会增加公司价值。
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Does Board "Independence" Destroy Corporate Value?
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) has required all listed firms to either adopt a majority of "independent" board members without links either to management or to substantial shareholders or explain "if not, why not". While this close to a global standard, it is the opposite to US exchanges who also require "independence from management" but are explicit in stating that significant shareholding need be no barrier to independence. Within a framework of both fixed firm and combined industry-year effects such that each firm is compared with itself, we show that firm performance declines significantly as affected outside directors depart the firm to make way for "Independents". Regular Gray directors make better acquisition decisions, increase the proportion of incentives in CEO pay, and raise dividend payouts. The presence of more executives on the board significantly reduces the CEO’s pay, while combining the role of CEO and chair adds to firm value.
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