利己偏见与税收士气

Kay Blaufus, Matthias Braune, Jochen Hundsdoerfer, M. Jacob
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引用次数: 13

摘要

在一个操纵逃税机会的实际实验室实验中,我们研究了对逃税的道德评价是否受到自我服务偏见的影响。我们发现,税收士气是利己主义的偏见:有机会逃税的人认为,与那些无法逃税的人相比,逃税的不道德程度更低。检测概率不影响此结果。此外,我们没有发现道德溢出效应,例如对法律活动的影响。
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Self-Serving Bias and Tax Morale
In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.
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