{"title":"评估救济与并购溢价","authors":"P. Mahoney, Mark I. Weinstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.151488","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the option to redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions, including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares, however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sample empirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on target shareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergers involving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisal reduces average shareholder gains in transactions involving self-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, we find no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive or negative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums\",\"authors\":\"P. Mahoney, Mark I. Weinstein\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.151488\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the option to redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions, including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares, however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sample empirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on target shareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergers involving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisal reduces average shareholder gains in transactions involving self-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, we find no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive or negative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.\",\"PeriodicalId\":332226,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1999-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.151488\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.151488","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the option to redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions, including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares, however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sample empirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on target shareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergers involving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisal reduces average shareholder gains in transactions involving self-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, we find no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive or negative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.