道德称谓的美学

Matthew Congdon
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要:人际道德称呼行为依赖于一个共享的社会可见性空间,在这个空间中,人们既可以展示自己,也可以感知他人的道德重要性。这就提出了一些问题,这些问题在最近关于道德演讲的哲学著作中基本上没有被讨论过。意识形态等力量对人际感知的社会中介如何塑造和限制道德讲话的可能性?展示自己的创造性行为是如何使意想不到的道德表达形式成为可能的,尤其是在意识形态的条件下?在本文中,我建议我们可以通过将道德称呼视为一种基本的审美现象来回答这些问题。首先,我从文学作品中举出一些例子,这些文学作品认为人类和动物具有道德价值的特征,这些特征对经验主义观点是开放的,并认为不利用这一观点的道德解决方法面临严重的限制,重点是斯蒂芬·达沃尔的《第二人称观点》。然后,我通过阅读“国会大厦爬行”来说明美学在道德演讲中的作用,这是1990年残疾人为了登上通往美国国会大厦的楼梯而留下辅助设备的直接行动。从Iris Murdoch的一些观点中,我认为这种道德演讲的集体行为的美学特征与它所表达的道德要求是分不开的,而且,作为一个美学整体来阅读,它的道德表达能力超越了话语,但仍然是理性空间的一部分。
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The Aesthetics of Moral Address
ABSTRACT:Acts of interpersonal moral address depend upon a shared space of social visibility in which human beings can both display themselves and perceive others as morally important. This raises questions that have gone largely undiscussed in recent philosophical work on moral address. How does the social mediation of interpersonal perception by forces such as ideology shape and limit the possibilities for moral address? And how might creative acts of putting oneself on display make possible unanticipated forms of moral address, especially under ideological conditions? In this paper, I propose that we can make progress towards answering such questions by treating moral address as a fundamentally aesthetic phenomenon. I begin by drawing examples from literature that invite the idea that humans and animals possess ethically value-laden features that are open to empirical view, and argue that approaches to moral address that do not avail themselves of this idea face serious limits, focusing on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint. I then illustrate the role of the aesthetic in moral address by offering a reading of the “Capitol Crawl,” a 1990 direct action in which people with disabilities left behind assistive devices in order to ascend the stairs leading to the US Capitol. Drawing from some ideas in Iris Murdoch, I argue that the aesthetically striking features of this collective act of moral address are inseparable from the moral demands it expresses, and that, read as an aesthetic whole, its morally expressive power extends beyond the discursive while nevertheless remaining a part of the space of reasons.
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