尽职调查辩护和瑞富公司IPO

Edward G. Pekarek
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引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管1933年《证券法》第11条和第12条对证券承销商施加了沉重的义务,但让承销商承担发现发行前欺诈的全部责任似乎是不合适的,尤其是考虑到其双重角色,以及其作为依赖看门人的地位。如果欺诈性行为被犯罪者隐藏得如此之好,以至于即使是ipo前的私募股权投资者、审计师、sro,甚至联邦监管机构等经验丰富的各方都没有发现欺诈的重要事实,承销公司在没有积极参与掩盖欺诈的情况下,也不能被合理地解释为有罪,甚至可能不承担与发行人及其高管隐藏得很好的计划有关的损失的责任。
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The Due Diligence Defense and the Refco IPO
Despite weighty obligations imposed upon securities underwriters by Section 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Act, it seems inappropriate to saddle the underwriter with the entire burden to discover pre-offering fraud, especially in light of its dual roles, as well as its status as a dependent gatekeeper. Where fraudulent activity is so well concealed by perpetrators that even sophisticated parties such as pre-IPO private equity investors, auditors, SROs, and perhaps even federal regulators, do not uncover material facts of the fraud, underwriting firms, absent active involvement in concealing fraud, cannot be reasonably construed as culpable, and perhaps not even liable, for losses connected to and caused by the well concealed schemes of an issuer and its executives.
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