Legislative Parties and the Cost of Indiscipline in the Ukrainian Rada

Over the years Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada has often been cited as a relatively chaotic legislature. the Scholars researching Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada have examined the causes of party indiscipline (e.g., Herron 2002a; Thames 2005, 2007a, 2016, 2007b; Whitmore 2002). Yet, few scholars have examined whether this indiscipline undermines the ability of parties to achieved their legislative agenda. Using roll-call and bill data from the Rada between 1998 and 2002, I analyze the costs of indiscipline. I find that while discipline for parties was often low, the costs of this indiscipline on floor votes was often low. Parties differed in the amount of costs they bore in predictable ways; however, the overall costs were not high. An analysis of agenda setting suggests that the agenda was controlled by parties to keep unpopular bills off the floor.