Does investment committee mitigate the risk of financial distress in GCC? The role of investment inefficiency

Purpose The purpose of this study is to empirically examine how the voluntary formation of a specialised investment committee (IC) and IC characteristics affect financial distress risk (FDR) and whether such impact is influenced by the level of investment inefficiency. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) non-financial companies during 2006–2016. A principal component analysis is done to aggregate and derive a factor score for IC characteristics (i.e. independence, size and meeting) as a proxy for the effectiveness of IC. This study also uses three measurements of FDR to corroborate the findings and partitions sample firms into overinvesting and underinvesting companies to examine the potential impact of investment inefficiency on the IC–FDR nexus. Findings Using feasible generalised least square estimation method, the authors document that the likelihood of financial distress occurrence decreases for firms with separate ICs. The authors also find that firms with effective ICs enjoy lower FDR. In other words, the probability of financial distress minimises if the IC is large, meets frequently and has a high number of independent directors. However, the authors find neither any moderation nor any mediation effect of investment inefficiency for the impact of IC and IC attributes on FDR. The additional analysis indicates the expected benefits of an actively performing IC are amplified for firms with risk of both over- and underinvestment. These findings are robust to alternative measures of FDR and investment inefficiency, sub-sample analysis and endogeneity concerns. Originality/value This study, to the best of researchers’ knowledge, is the first to provide evidence in GCC firms’ perspective, suggesting that the existence of an effective IC is associated with a lower risk of financial distress, and to some extent, the economic benefits of IC are aggrandised for companies with a high probability of over- and underinvestment problems. These results are unique and contribute to a small but growing body of literature documenting the need for effective ICs and their economic consequences on investment efficiency in the FDR environment. The findings of this study carry valuable practical implications for regulatory bodies, policymakers, investors and other interested parties in the GCC region.