{"title":"新企业公司的CEO薪酬、激励与治理","authors":"Lerong He, M. Conyon","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000051","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO COMPENSATION, INCENTIVES, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEW ENTERPRISE FIRMS\",\"authors\":\"Lerong He, M. Conyon\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/S0219868104000051\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.\",\"PeriodicalId\":128457,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Derivatives Accounting\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"16\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Derivatives Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO COMPENSATION, INCENTIVES, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEW ENTERPRISE FIRMS
This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.
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