{"title":"关于公共物品供应和商品税的说明","authors":"Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.178","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"stratedthat the dead weight losses arising from the price distortions will increase the unit social cost of the public goods, and therefore will reduce their optimal level. The second best rule for the provision of public goods when linear taxes are available was analyzed formally in Atkinson and Stern (1974), and wildasin (1979) in the identical consumers setting. They concentrated on the dead weight loss (efficiency loss) effects and showed that Pigou's conjecture is satisfied in the normal case, but that if highly taxed commodities are strong complements of the public good then it may not be satisfied. King (1986) extended this rule to an (infinitely) many consumers case.1) He derived a many person Pigovian rule which is the dual to the many person Ramsey rule in Diamond (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and asserted that the optimal level of public goods depends not only on tax distortion effects but also on distribution effects. To obtain a clear interpretation of the rule, he assumed that a poll tax is available to the government. Though this assumption pro ducesa simple and intuitive formula, it cancels out two other important effects. This note derives the second best rule for the optimal provision of public goods in heteroge neousconsumers setting by using an expenditure approach. The rule is decomposed into three effects; the revenue repercussion effect, the Pigou-Harberger's dead weight loss effect, and the total distribution effect of public goods. The third effect contains not only the direct distribution effects of providing public goods as King (1986) asserted, but also the indirect distribution effects which are associated with the commodity tax increase necessary to finance the public good This decomposed formula enables us to compare the heterogeneous consumers case with homogene ousconsumer case. Patina (1990) obtained a similar result employing a cost-benefit analysis. Since his approach differs from our optimization approach, we cannot compare the result here and his result directly. Nonetheless, we can find a similar decomposition formula even in the cost benefit analysis case by specifying explicit government's tax finance ways. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we derive the decomposed second best rule for the","PeriodicalId":271985,"journal":{"name":"The Economic studies quarterly","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A NOTE ON PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION AND COMMODITY TAXES\",\"authors\":\"Hideo Konishi\",\"doi\":\"10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.178\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"stratedthat the dead weight losses arising from the price distortions will increase the unit social cost of the public goods, and therefore will reduce their optimal level. The second best rule for the provision of public goods when linear taxes are available was analyzed formally in Atkinson and Stern (1974), and wildasin (1979) in the identical consumers setting. They concentrated on the dead weight loss (efficiency loss) effects and showed that Pigou's conjecture is satisfied in the normal case, but that if highly taxed commodities are strong complements of the public good then it may not be satisfied. King (1986) extended this rule to an (infinitely) many consumers case.1) He derived a many person Pigovian rule which is the dual to the many person Ramsey rule in Diamond (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and asserted that the optimal level of public goods depends not only on tax distortion effects but also on distribution effects. To obtain a clear interpretation of the rule, he assumed that a poll tax is available to the government. Though this assumption pro ducesa simple and intuitive formula, it cancels out two other important effects. This note derives the second best rule for the optimal provision of public goods in heteroge neousconsumers setting by using an expenditure approach. The rule is decomposed into three effects; the revenue repercussion effect, the Pigou-Harberger's dead weight loss effect, and the total distribution effect of public goods. The third effect contains not only the direct distribution effects of providing public goods as King (1986) asserted, but also the indirect distribution effects which are associated with the commodity tax increase necessary to finance the public good This decomposed formula enables us to compare the heterogeneous consumers case with homogene ousconsumer case. Patina (1990) obtained a similar result employing a cost-benefit analysis. Since his approach differs from our optimization approach, we cannot compare the result here and his result directly. Nonetheless, we can find a similar decomposition formula even in the cost benefit analysis case by specifying explicit government's tax finance ways. Section 2 presents the model. 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A NOTE ON PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION AND COMMODITY TAXES
stratedthat the dead weight losses arising from the price distortions will increase the unit social cost of the public goods, and therefore will reduce their optimal level. The second best rule for the provision of public goods when linear taxes are available was analyzed formally in Atkinson and Stern (1974), and wildasin (1979) in the identical consumers setting. They concentrated on the dead weight loss (efficiency loss) effects and showed that Pigou's conjecture is satisfied in the normal case, but that if highly taxed commodities are strong complements of the public good then it may not be satisfied. King (1986) extended this rule to an (infinitely) many consumers case.1) He derived a many person Pigovian rule which is the dual to the many person Ramsey rule in Diamond (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and asserted that the optimal level of public goods depends not only on tax distortion effects but also on distribution effects. To obtain a clear interpretation of the rule, he assumed that a poll tax is available to the government. Though this assumption pro ducesa simple and intuitive formula, it cancels out two other important effects. This note derives the second best rule for the optimal provision of public goods in heteroge neousconsumers setting by using an expenditure approach. The rule is decomposed into three effects; the revenue repercussion effect, the Pigou-Harberger's dead weight loss effect, and the total distribution effect of public goods. The third effect contains not only the direct distribution effects of providing public goods as King (1986) asserted, but also the indirect distribution effects which are associated with the commodity tax increase necessary to finance the public good This decomposed formula enables us to compare the heterogeneous consumers case with homogene ousconsumer case. Patina (1990) obtained a similar result employing a cost-benefit analysis. Since his approach differs from our optimization approach, we cannot compare the result here and his result directly. Nonetheless, we can find a similar decomposition formula even in the cost benefit analysis case by specifying explicit government's tax finance ways. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we derive the decomposed second best rule for the