或有固定契约——经典代理理论的替代方案

ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-04 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2336193

Susheng Wang

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摘要

对于经典的代理模型(Holmstrom, 1979)，在不同的假设下，我们提供了一个与文献中标准解决方案完全不同的解决方案。我们的最优合同具有封闭形式，提供有条件的固定付款，并且是有效的。相比之下，文献中的标准契约除一种特殊情况外，由四个方程隐式确定，基于不可靠的一阶方法，是低效的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Contingent Fixed Contracts - An Alternative to the Classic Agency Theory

For the classic agency model (Holmstrom, 1979), under different assumptions, we offer a completely different solution than the standard solution in the literature. Our optimal contract has a closed form, offers a contingent fixed payment, and is efficient. In contrast, the standard contract in the literature is implicitly determined by four equations except for one special case, is based on the unreliable first-order approach, and is inefficient.

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ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)

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