用正式和实用的方法分析和保护某些/IP汽车服务

Daniel Zelle, Timm Lauser, Dustin Kern, C. Krauß
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引用次数: 12

摘要

汽车以太网越来越多地用于现代车辆,并补充或取代传统总线系统,如CAN。以太网还支持通过IP (SOME/IP)中间件与可扩展的面向服务的中间件进行面向服务的通信。本文对基于IP的可扩展面向服务中间件(SOME/IP)、已识别的中间人攻击(MITM)进行了形式化和实用的安全分析,并提出了两种安全扩展。即使将SOME/IP与链路层安全机制结合使用,也有可能受到攻击。攻击者可以模拟服务提供服务器和服务消费客户端。两种最常见的通信方法,请求/响应和发布/订阅,都是脆弱的。在大多数通信场景中,我们能够通过攻击者路由所有消息。我们用于服务供应和使用的身份验证和授权的安全扩展可以防止这些攻击。我们正式分析了安全性并评估了实际实现的开销。
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Analyzing and Securing SOME/IP Automotive Services with Formal and Practical Methods
Automotive Ethernet is increasingly used in modern vehicles and complements or replaces legacy bus systems such as CAN. Ethernet also enables service-oriented communication with the Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP (SOME/IP) middleware. In this paper, we present a formal and practical security analysis of Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP (SOME/IP), the identified Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, and propose two security extensions. The attacks are possible even if SOME/IP is used in combination with link layer security mechanisms. The attacker can impersonate a service offering server and a service consuming client. The two most common communication methods, request/response and publish/subscribe, are both vulnerable. In most communication scenarios, we are able to route all messages over the attacker. Our security extensions for authentication and authorization of service provisioning and usage protect against these attacks. We formally analyze the security and evaluate the overhead with practical implementations.
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