理性与伊恩·哈金的科学推理风格

K. Abímbola
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摘要

当代科学哲学中有一种观点认为,作为科学进步的一部分,科学方法论本身也会发生根本性的变化。根据这种观点,科学的变化并不局限于公认的理论。科学理论评价的核心原则,包括用于对理论进行排序和赋予真理价值的规则和类别,据说也会随着科学的发展而发生根本性的变化。在本文中,我考察了伊恩·哈金(1975;1980;1982;1983;1985;1996;1999;2012)这个非不变方法学论文的版本。我认为,就像托马斯·库恩的“范式”、拉里·劳顿的“研究传统”和伊姆雷·拉卡托斯的“研究计划”一样,哈金的“推理风格”未能充分说明科学进步。
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Reason versus Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning
There is a view in contemporary philosophy of science according to which scientific methodology itself is subject to radical change as part of scientific progress. According to this view, change in science is not confined to accepted theories. The core principles of scientific theory appraisal, including the rules and categories used to rank and confer truth-values on theories, are also said to be subject to radical change as science develops. In this paper, I examine Ian Hacking’s (1975; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1985; 1996; 1999; 2012) version of this no-invariant-methodology thesis. I argue that, just like Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms,” Larry Laudan’s “research traditions,” and Imre Lakatos’ “research programmes,” Hacking’s “styles of reasoning” fail to give an adequate account of scientific progress.
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