自报告供应商采购:供应链中社会责任的战略沟通

Tao Lu, Brian Tomlin
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引用次数: 6

摘要

问题定义:为了管理供应商社会责任(SR),一些公司采用了一种自我评估策略,要求供应商自我报告其社会责任能力。自我报告的信息很难核实,这就导致了一个重要的可信度问题:买家能指望得到真实的报告吗?我们检查供应商的SR能力是否可以通过自由和不可验证的自我报告可信地传达。学术/实践相关性:社会责任是企业的战略重点,因为消费者关心道德生产。一些公司依靠供应商的自我评估作为他们的SR战略的一部分。理解这种方法的价值和挑战是很重要的。方法:我们开发了一个供应商和买家的廉价谈话模型。供应商被赋予一个给定的SR级别(供应商私下知道),表示没有违规的可能性。买方在一个对公开的SR违规行为敏感的市场上出售。供应商首先向买方传达其SR级别,然后买方在两种审核严格级别之间选择对供应商进行审核,并选择订购多少。结果:如果(i)买方向高类型供应商订购了更多数量的订单,但实施了比低类型供应商更严格的审计,(ii)高类型供应商选择了更大的订单,而低类型供应商担心审计失败而没有选择,那么有影响力的真实沟通可能会在均衡中出现。当审计变得更加昂贵时,买方会受益。管理含义:供应商SR自我评估对买方来说可能是一个有价值的策略,但前提是买方可以访问不同级别的审计能力,并且没有预先承诺到特定级别。对于公司来说,参与前期审计步骤以确保获得批准的供应商的最低SR能力是有价值的,因为非常低绩效的供应商从不真实报告。实施供应商自我评估可能有助于也可能无助于减少潜在的SR违规行为造成的社会损害;我们知道什么时候有帮助,什么时候没有。
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Sourcing from a Self-Reporting Supplier: Strategic Communication of Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain
Problem definition: To manage supplier social responsibility (SR), some firms have adopted a self-assessment strategy whereby they ask suppliers to self-report SR capabilities. Self-reported information is difficult to verify, and this leads to an important credibility question: can a buyer expect truthful reporting? We examine whether a supplier’s SR capability can be credibly communicated through free and unverifiable self-reporting. Academic/practical relevance: SR is a strategic focus for firms because consumers care about ethical production. Some firms rely on supplier self-assessment as part of their SR strategy. It is important to understand the value and challenges of this approach. Methodology: We develop a cheap talk model of a supplier and a buyer. The supplier is endowed with a given SR level (privately known to the supplier) that represents the probability of no violation. The buyer sells in a market that is sensitive to publicized SR violations. The supplier first communicates its SR level to the buyer, and then the buyer chooses between two audit stringency levels to conduct on the supplier and also chooses how much to order. Results: Influential truthful communication may emerge in equilibrium if (i) the buyer orders a larger quantity from the high-type supplier but imposes a more stringent audit than the buyer would for the low type and (ii) the high-type supplier opts for this larger order, whereas the low-type, fearing audit failure, does not. The buyer can benefit as the audit becomes more expensive. Managerial implications: Supplier SR self-assessments can be a valuable strategy for buyers but only if the buyer has access to auditing capabilities of different levels and does not precommit to a particular level. It is valuable for firms to engage in an up-front auditing step to ensure a minimum SR capability of approved suppliers because very low-performing suppliers never truthfully report. Implementing supplier self-assessments may or may not help reduce the social damage resulting from potential SR violations; we identify situations when it helps and when it does not.
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