当共同作者加入编辑委员会时

Lorenzo Ductor, B. Visser
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在个人层面上使用新颖的大规模数据,我们发现,当一名合著者加入编委会时,无论是在“合著者”的期刊上还是在其他期刊上,一名作者发表的文章都更多。这种影响越大,作者越缺乏经验,一旦合著者离开期刊董事会,这种影响就会迅速消失。在我们考虑解释这些模式的假说中,信号假说是一个强有力的竞争者。它认为,共同作者地位的暂时提高改善了作者的困境,因为它改善了编辑委员会对作者潜在素质的推断。只有偏袒假说可以解释,特别是在董事会更替率低的期刊上,合著者在编委会任职期间发表的文章比其他年份发表的文章得到的引用要少。
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When a Coauthor Joins an Editorial Board
Using novel and large-scale data at the individual level, we find that an author publishes more articles when a coauthor joins an editorial board, both in the "coauthor's'" journal and in other journals. This effect is larger, the less experienced the author is, and disappears quickly once the coauthor leaves the journal's board. Of the hypotheses that we consider to explain these patterns, the signalling hypothesis is a strong contender. It argues that the temporary increase in status of the coauthor improves the plight of the author as it improves the inference that editorial boards make about the author's underlying quality. Only the favoritism hypothesis can explain that, especially at journals with low board turnover, articles published during a coauthor's stint on the editorial board receive less citations than articles published during other years.
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