无中介者的保合算

Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Vassilis Zikas
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引用次数: 5

摘要

无合谋(CF)和保合谋(CP)协议丰富了多方计算(MPC)提供的标准安全性,以解决潜意识通信不受欢迎的设置。然而,所有现有的解决方案都对设置做出了不切实际的假设,例如各方的实际存在,对物理信封的访问或极端隔离,其中唯一的通信手段是星形拓扑网络。上述情况仍然是这种议定书的限制,不可能的结果甚至加强了这种限制。因此,多年来一直不清楚上述设定假设是否以及如何放宽到更现实的情况。由于人们对将硬件令牌用于加密应用的兴趣日益浓厚,在这项工作中,我们提供了第一个保持合谋计算的解决方案,该解决方案使用了比现有技术更弱、更常见的假设,即经过身份验证的广播功能和对诚实生成的可信硬件令牌的访问。我们证明,只要没有参与方中止,我们的协议是合谋保护(简称CP)安全的。在对手终止攻击的情况下,我们的协议仍然通过可识别的(和一致的)终止实现标准(G)UC安全性。利用上述可识别性,我们使用惩罚方案来增强协议,该方案确保中止是无利可图的,从而获得针对激励驱动的攻击者的CP安全性。为了定义(并证明)后一种结果,我们将Garay等人[FOCS 2013]的Rational协议设计(RPD)方法与Alwen等人[CRYPTO 2012]的CP框架结合起来,得出在激励驱动的本地对手存在的情况下的安全性定义,这些对手可能具有独立的利益。与现有的CP/CF解决方案类似,我们的协议作为一种后备方案,即使在设置(即硬件令牌)被破坏或损坏时,也可以保留针对单一对手的安全性。此外,我们的后备方案实现了可识别和一致的中止,这在以前的CP方案中是不可能的。
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Collusion-Preserving Computation without a Mediator
Collusion-free (CF) and collusion-preserving (CP) protocols enrich the standard security offered by multi-party computation (MPC), to tackle settings where subliminal communication is undesirable. However, all existing solutions make arguably unrealistic assumptions on setups, such as physical presence of the parties, access to physical envelopes, or extreme isolation, where the only means of communication is a star-topology network. The above state of affairs remained a limitation of such protocols, which was even reinforced by impossibility results. Thus, for years, it has been unclear if and how the above setup assumptions could be relaxed towards more realistic scenarios. Motivated also by the increasing interest in using hardware tokens for cryptographic applications, in this work we provide the first solution to collusion preserving computation which uses weaker and more common assumptions than the state of the art, i.e., an authenticated broadcast functionality and access to honestly generated trusted hardware tokens. We prove that our protocol is collusion-preserving (in short, CP) secure as long as no parties abort. In the case of an aborting adversary, our protocol still achieves standard (G)UC security with identifiable (and unanimous) abort. Leveraging the above identifiability property, we augment our protocol with a penalization scheme which ensures that it is not profitable to abort, thereby obtaining CP security against incentive-driven attackers. To define (and prove) this latter result, we combine the Rational Protocol Design (RPD) methodology by Garay et al. [FOCS 2013] with the CP framework of Alwen et al. [CRYPTO 2012] to derive a definition of security in the presence of incentive-driven local adversaries which can be of independent interest. Similar to existing CP/CF solutions, our protocol preserves, as a fallback, security against monolithic adversaries, even when the setup (i.e., the hardware tokens) is compromised or corrupted. In addition, our fallback solution achieves identifiable and unanimous abort, which we prove are impossible in previous CP solutions.
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