基于博弈论的面向隐私保护的移动众感分析

Rong Ma, Jinbo Xiong, Mingwei Lin, Zhiqiang Yao, Hui Lin, Ayong Ye
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引用次数: 17

摘要

移动众测作为物联网的一种新方法,为实现无所不在的社会感知提供了一种新的途径。本文从博弈论的角度分析了声誉激励机制,讨论了移动众筹中的囚徒困境。首先,我们基于数据分析的准确性给出了感知用户贡献的形式化定义,并在此基础上提出了声誉激励机制,该机制考虑了感知数据的隐私保护,鼓励更多的感知用户持续提供高质量的数据参与移动众测。此外,我们观察到感知用户的利益不仅取决于他们自己的贡献,还取决于服务提供者和中介之间最终数据交易的结果。然而,由于交易双方的自私选择,这种数据交易容易陷入囚徒困境。因此,我们对上述数据交易中的囚徒困境进行了分析和讨论,并给出了相应的解决方案。最后,对移动众测隐私保护的未来研究方向进行了展望。
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Privacy Protection-Oriented Mobile Crowdsensing Analysis Based on Game Theory
As a new method of the Internet of Things (IoT), the mobile crowdsensing provides a novel way to realize the ubiquitous social perception. From the point of the game theory, this paper addresses the reputation incentive mechanism and discusses the prisoner's dilemma in the mobile crowdsensing. Firstly, we give a formal definition of the sensing user's contribution based on the accuracy in data analysis, and propose a reputation incentive mechanism based on this contribution, which considers the privacy protection of the sensing data and encourages more sensing users to continually provide the highquality data to participate in the mobile crowdsensing. Furthermore, we observe that the sensing user's benefits not only depend on their own contribution, but also rely on the outcome of the final data transaction between the service provider and the mediator. However, this data transaction is vulnerable to the prisoner's dilemma due to the selfish choice of the both parties. Therefore, we analyze and discuss the prisoner's dilemma in the above data transactionsand give the corresponding solutions. Finally, we point outsome future research directions about privacy protection ofthe mobile crowdsensing.
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