{"title":"欧洲的财政政策和利率","authors":"R. Faini","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00163.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> The appetite for fiscal discipline has been steadily declining among most industrial countries. In the past, fiscal profligacy would have been punished by markets with higher interest rates and, in some cases, also exchange rate depreciation. However, in post-EMU Europe, exchange rate markets no longer discipline the fiscal behaviour of national governments. Perhaps more crucially, even the interest rate punishment to fiscal indiscipline is highly uncertain, with academic opinions being quite divided on this issue. This paper takes a close look at the link between fiscal policy and interest rates in the European context. The key finding is that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will have an effect both on its spreads and on the overall level of interest rates for the currency union as a whole, with the second effect, however, being quantitatively much more significant. This suggests that there are indeed substantial spillovers, through the interest rate channel, among fiscal policies of member countries. To limit countries’ incentive to run expansionary fiscal policies, a set of rules, like those embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact, is then needed. Some (weak) evidence is also found that after EMU, interest rate spillovers seem to be more significant for high debt countries with unsustainable fiscal policies, reflecting perhaps market concerns about a possible sovereign bail out or the impact of financial distress. There may be a case then for imposing tighter rules on high debt countries. — Riccardo Faini","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"231","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fiscal Policy and Interest Rates in Europe\",\"authors\":\"R. Faini\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00163.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"type=\\\"main\\\" xml:lang=\\\"en\\\"> The appetite for fiscal discipline has been steadily declining among most industrial countries. In the past, fiscal profligacy would have been punished by markets with higher interest rates and, in some cases, also exchange rate depreciation. However, in post-EMU Europe, exchange rate markets no longer discipline the fiscal behaviour of national governments. Perhaps more crucially, even the interest rate punishment to fiscal indiscipline is highly uncertain, with academic opinions being quite divided on this issue. This paper takes a close look at the link between fiscal policy and interest rates in the European context. The key finding is that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will have an effect both on its spreads and on the overall level of interest rates for the currency union as a whole, with the second effect, however, being quantitatively much more significant. This suggests that there are indeed substantial spillovers, through the interest rate channel, among fiscal policies of member countries. To limit countries’ incentive to run expansionary fiscal policies, a set of rules, like those embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact, is then needed. Some (weak) evidence is also found that after EMU, interest rate spillovers seem to be more significant for high debt countries with unsustainable fiscal policies, reflecting perhaps market concerns about a possible sovereign bail out or the impact of financial distress. There may be a case then for imposing tighter rules on high debt countries. — Riccardo Faini\",\"PeriodicalId\":236508,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"231\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00163.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00163.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 231
摘要
大多数工业国家对财政纪律的兴趣一直在稳步下降。在过去,财政挥霍会受到市场的惩罚,利率会更高,在某些情况下,还会受到汇率贬值的惩罚。然而,在后欧洲货币联盟时代,汇率市场不再约束各国政府的财政行为。或许更关键的是,就连对财政违规行为的利率惩罚也高度不确定,学术界在这个问题上的意见分歧很大。本文对欧洲背景下的财政政策与利率之间的联系进行了深入研究。关键的发现是,一个欧洲货币联盟成员国的扩张性财政政策将对其息差和整个货币联盟的整体利率水平产生影响,然而,第二种影响在数量上要显著得多。这表明,通过利率渠道,成员国的财政政策之间确实存在巨大的溢出效应。为了限制各国实施扩张性财政政策的动机,需要制定一套规则,就像《稳定与增长公约》(Stability and Growth Pact)所规定的那样。一些(微弱的)证据还表明,在欧洲货币联盟之后,利率溢出效应似乎对财政政策不可持续的高债务国家更为显著,这可能反映了市场对可能的主权纾困或金融困境影响的担忧。或许有理由对高负债国家实施更严格的规定。——里卡多·菲尼
type="main" xml:lang="en"> The appetite for fiscal discipline has been steadily declining among most industrial countries. In the past, fiscal profligacy would have been punished by markets with higher interest rates and, in some cases, also exchange rate depreciation. However, in post-EMU Europe, exchange rate markets no longer discipline the fiscal behaviour of national governments. Perhaps more crucially, even the interest rate punishment to fiscal indiscipline is highly uncertain, with academic opinions being quite divided on this issue. This paper takes a close look at the link between fiscal policy and interest rates in the European context. The key finding is that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will have an effect both on its spreads and on the overall level of interest rates for the currency union as a whole, with the second effect, however, being quantitatively much more significant. This suggests that there are indeed substantial spillovers, through the interest rate channel, among fiscal policies of member countries. To limit countries’ incentive to run expansionary fiscal policies, a set of rules, like those embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact, is then needed. Some (weak) evidence is also found that after EMU, interest rate spillovers seem to be more significant for high debt countries with unsustainable fiscal policies, reflecting perhaps market concerns about a possible sovereign bail out or the impact of financial distress. There may be a case then for imposing tighter rules on high debt countries. — Riccardo Faini