{"title":"在获胜者少或多的比赛中努力的强度","authors":"Dimitry Rtischev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679105","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper applies multi-prize contest theory to explore the connection between scarcity of prizes and intensity of competition. Equilibrium levels of effort are compared across contests that differ in the number of prizes and in which the utility of winning or losing is influenced by the relative numbers of winners and losers. Application to the study of socioeconomic competition is discussed.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Intensity of Effort in Contests with Few or Many Winners\",\"authors\":\"Dimitry Rtischev\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3679105\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper applies multi-prize contest theory to explore the connection between scarcity of prizes and intensity of competition. Equilibrium levels of effort are compared across contests that differ in the number of prizes and in which the utility of winning or losing is influenced by the relative numbers of winners and losers. Application to the study of socioeconomic competition is discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":129815,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679105\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679105","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Intensity of Effort in Contests with Few or Many Winners
The paper applies multi-prize contest theory to explore the connection between scarcity of prizes and intensity of competition. Equilibrium levels of effort are compared across contests that differ in the number of prizes and in which the utility of winning or losing is influenced by the relative numbers of winners and losers. Application to the study of socioeconomic competition is discussed.
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