{"title":"现实主义、收敛性和可加性","authors":"Cory Juhl, Kevin T. Kelly","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Realism, Convergence, and Additivity\",\"authors\":\"Cory Juhl, Kevin T. Kelly\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193023\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped.\",\"PeriodicalId\":288090,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1994-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193023\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193023","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped.
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