高管薪酬回扣及其税收

David I. Walker
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引用次数: 2

摘要

高管薪酬追回条款要求高管在某些情况下偿还先前获得的薪酬,例如,对其激励薪酬所依据的财务业绩进行下调。这些条款的使用正在增加,预计SEC将很快敲定实施强制性、无过错追回要求的规则,这是多德-弗兰克法案(Dodd-Frank)的一部分。收回带来的税收问题是这样的:高管们是否应该被允许收回此前因收回条款返还给公司的薪酬而缴纳的税款?本文认为,完整的税收抵销制度最符合不断发展的税收抵销的基本原理,对受抵销影响的高管采取一致的待遇,鼓励公平地实施抵销,并最大限度地减少由抵销引起的扭曲和其他与税收制度相关的意想不到的后果,而税收制度不能提供完全的抵销。但是,退税的税收待遇一直不确定,而《减税与就业法案》的颁布又增加了这种不确定性。与此同时,通过立法确保高管们获得全额补偿,以弥补之前为收回的薪酬所缴纳的税款,在政治上可能是行不通的。鉴于此,本文认为,美国国税局和法院应自由地解释相关税法,以最大限度地收回因追回赔偿而支付的税款。
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Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation
Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay was predicated. The use of these provisions is on the rise, and the SEC is expected to soon finalize rules implementing a mandatory, no-fault clawback requirement enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation. The tax issue raised by clawbacks is this: should executives be allowed to recover taxes previously paid on compensation that is returned to the company as a result of a clawback provision? This Article argues that a full tax offset regime is most in keeping with the evolving rationales for clawbacks, with consistent treatment of executives subject to clawbacks, with encouraging even-handed implementation of clawbacks, and with minimizing clawback-induced distortions and other unintended consequences associated with a tax regime that would not provide full offsets. But the tax treatment of clawback payments has been uncertain, and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act adds to that uncertainty. Meanwhile, adoption of legislation to ensure that executives are fully compensated for taxes previously paid on recouped compensation is probably a political non-starter. Given that, this Article argues that the IRS and courts should interpret the relevant tax laws liberally to maximize recovery of taxes paid on clawed back compensation.
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