关键港口基础设施网络安全评估框架

D. Trimble, Jonathon Monken, Alexander F. L. Sand
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引用次数: 8

摘要

几乎所有的全球经济贸易都通过港口和更广泛的多式联运系统流动,其中支持技术网络往往是私人拥有和经营的。大多数政府监管和行业合作的重点是船舶的实际进出和安全建造和运营。关键海上和互联基础设施的网络安全在很大程度上仍然不受监管,对网络安全风险的评估或缓解程度最低。这些关键的基础设施网络包括工业控制、SCADA和信息技术系统,其中大部分是专有的,依赖于从能源到交通等交叉领域的运营支持或相互依赖。尽管许多基础设施运营商都担心网络安全问题,但由于其系统的复杂性、与其他部门的相互依赖性,以及公众对减轻这些关键经济要道的网络风险的极大兴趣,迫切需要标准化框架来评估海上网络安全风险。我们的工作确定了影响海事基础设施的网络风险因素,提出了降低风险的障碍,并建议建立一个独立的公共/私人实体来评估、控制和降低潜在风险。
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A framework for cybersecurity assessments of critical port infrastructure
Nearly all global economic trade flows through the ports and a broader intermodal transit system in which supporting technology networks are often privately owned and operated. The majority of government oversight and industry cooperation focuses on physical access and the safe construction and operation of ships. The cybersecurity of critical maritime and interconnected infrastructure remains largely unregulated with minimal, if any, assessment or mitigation of cybersecurity risks. These critical infrastructure networks encompass industrial control, SCADA, and information technology systems — much of it proprietary and dependent on operational support or interdependencies in intersecting domains, from energy to transportation. While many operators of the infrastructure are concerned about cybersecurity, the complexity of their systems, interdependence with other sectors, and an outsized public interest in mitigating cyber risks against such crucial economic arteries demonstrates a compelling need for standardized frameworks for assessing cybersecurity risk in the maritime domain. Our work identifies cyber risk factors affecting maritime infrastructure, present barriers to mitigating risks, and proposes the creation of an independent public/private entity for assessing, containing, and mitigating potential risks.
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