开放固件的恶意代码检测

F. Adelstein, M. Stillerman, D. Kozen
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引用次数: 40

摘要

恶意引导固件对我们的全球信息基础设施来说是一个很大程度上未被认识到的重大安全风险。由于引导固件在加载操作系统之前执行,因此它可以很容易地绕过任何基于操作系统的安全机制。引导固件程序通常由第三方设备制造商编写,可能来自各种来源不明的供应商。我们描述了一种解决此问题的方法,该方法基于针对旨在限制对系统资源访问的标准安全策略的板载设备驱动程序的加载时验证。我们还描述了为开放固件引导平台构建该技术原型的持续努力。
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Malicious code detection for open firmware
Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically written by third-party device manufacturers and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. We describe an approach to this problem based on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against a standard security policy designed to limit access to system resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct a prototype of this technique for open firmware boot platforms.
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