{"title":"大板是糟糕的显示器吗?来自CEO离职的证据","authors":"O. Faleye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.498285","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relation between a board's size and its monitoring effectiveness by exploring how board size affects different aspects of the CEO replacement process. I find that the probability of CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to board size, and that the abnormal return accompanying turnover announcements decreases with board size. I also find that larger boards are less likely to appoint an outsider to succeed the terminated CEO. These results suggest that a large size hinders the board's ability to perform its monitoring functions, and lends additional support to the current drive toward smaller boards.","PeriodicalId":178342,"journal":{"name":"D'Amore-McKim: Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are Large Boards Poor Monitors? Evidence from CEO Turnover\",\"authors\":\"O. Faleye\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.498285\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines the relation between a board's size and its monitoring effectiveness by exploring how board size affects different aspects of the CEO replacement process. I find that the probability of CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to board size, and that the abnormal return accompanying turnover announcements decreases with board size. I also find that larger boards are less likely to appoint an outsider to succeed the terminated CEO. These results suggest that a large size hinders the board's ability to perform its monitoring functions, and lends additional support to the current drive toward smaller boards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":178342,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"D'Amore-McKim: Finance (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"D'Amore-McKim: Finance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.498285\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"D'Amore-McKim: Finance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.498285","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Are Large Boards Poor Monitors? Evidence from CEO Turnover
This paper examines the relation between a board's size and its monitoring effectiveness by exploring how board size affects different aspects of the CEO replacement process. I find that the probability of CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to board size, and that the abnormal return accompanying turnover announcements decreases with board size. I also find that larger boards are less likely to appoint an outsider to succeed the terminated CEO. These results suggest that a large size hinders the board's ability to perform its monitoring functions, and lends additional support to the current drive toward smaller boards.
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