论首席风险官和风险委员会在保障金融机构免于诉讼中的作用

Arash Amoozegar, Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Thomas J. Walker
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引用次数: 8

摘要

目的-在大多数金融机构中,首席风险官(cro)及其风险管理(RM)人员在管理风险暴露方面发挥作用,但他们缺乏对治理的参与被认为是导致2007-2008年金融危机的一个影响因素。各种立法和监管机构向金融公司施压,要求其改善风险治理结构,以更好地应对未来可能出现的危机。假设权控机构和风险委员会被赋予足够的权力来影响金融机构的公司治理,权控机构和风险委员会能否保护金融机构不违反可诉证券法?它们能改善银行业绩吗?本文旨在探讨这些问题。设计/方法论/方法-作者采用主成分分析来构建一个单一的衡量标准,以捕捉公司RM的各个方面。作者比较了被起诉公司与未被起诉公司的风险治理特征,并考虑了风险行为的最终结果之一:股东诉讼。作者计算了ROA和买入并持有的异常回报,以捕捉经营和股票绩效,并检验了风险治理是否通过降低诉讼风险来改善银行绩效。适当的风险治理可以降低公司的诉讼概率。将RM因素添加到先前在文献中提出的模型中,提高了这些模型在识别最容易受到集体诉讼的公司时的准确性。更好的RM提高了金融机构的财务和股票价格绩效。研究限制/影响-数据收集很费力,因为有关CRO治理的信息必须从10-K报告中手工收集。采用更广泛的样本,例如非美国银行,可能会对风险管理实践、股东诉讼和银行业绩之间的关系提供额外的见解。实际意义-研究表明,银行的RM功能在提高银行和经营绩效以及减少股东诉讼方面发挥着关键作用。银行应重视RM功能。原创性/价值——这是第一个检验风险管理与银行绩效之间正相关关系背后机制的研究。研究表明,更好的风险管理通过降低诉讼风险来提高银行的整体绩效。
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On the Role of the Chief Risk Officer and the Risk Committee in Insuring Financial Institutions Against Litigation
Purpose - In most financial institutions, chief risk officers (CROs) and their risk management (RM) staff fulfill a role in managing risk exposures, yet their lack of involvement in the governance has been cited as an influential factor that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Various legislative and regulatory bodies have pressured financial firms to improve their risk governance structures to better weather potential future crises. Assuming that CROs and risk committees are given sufficient power to influence the corporate governance of financial institutions, can CROs and risk committees protect financial institutions from violating litigable securities law? Can they improve bank performance? The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach - The authors employ a principal component analysis to construct a single measure that captures various aspects of RM in a firm. The authors compare the risk governance characteristics of sued firms with their non-sued peers and consider one of the final outcomes of risky behavior: shareholder litigation. The authors compute ROA and buy-and-hold abnormal returns to capture operating and stock performance and examine whether risk governance improves bank performance by reducing litigation risk. Findings - Proper risk governance reduces a firm’s litigation probability. The addition of the RM factor to models that have been previously proposed in the literature improves the accuracy of those models in identifying companies that are most susceptible to class action lawsuits. Better RM improves the financial and stock price performance of financial institutions. Research limitations/implications - The data collection is laborious as the information about CRO governance has to be hand-collected from the 10-K report. A broader sample employing, e.g., non-US banks may provide additional insights into the relationship between RM practices, shareholder litigation, and bank performance. Practical implications - The study shows that a bank’s RM functions play a critical role in improving bank and operating performance and in reducing shareholder litigation. Banks should emphasize the RM function. Originality/value - This is the first study to examine the mechanism behind the positive association between RM and bank performance. The study shows that better RM improves overall bank performance by decreasing litigation risk.
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