拥有和持有:对金钱的热爱与共同纳税申报有什么关系?

S. Mcmahon
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引用次数: 4

摘要

富有的纳税人一直试图减少他们的联邦所得税。在1948年之前,一种流行的方法是在配偶之间转移收入,这样丈夫的收入就可以更多地报告给他收入较低的妻子,并向他征税,从而降低纳税等级。1948年,国会取消了已婚夫妇从事这种避税行为的动机,在共同纳税申报单上增加了国有化的收入分配。这实际上使那些联合报税的人的纳税等级是单身纳税人的两倍,因此,有一个或主要收入来源的已婚夫妇比单身人士缴纳的所得税相对较少。如今,人们在争论是否要恢复类似于1948年以前实行的个人所得税制度。为了评估这一建议,本文首先探讨了收入分割联合回报的发展,以评估回报给个人系统的潜在成本和后果。个人申报激励了避税行为,减少了所得税的累进性,同时为从事税收规划的人提供了税收优惠,而对那些没有从事税收规划的人则增加了相对的税收负担。其次,本文考虑了美国国税局(Internal Revenue Service)控制这种避税行为的前景。回到个人申报制度将增加税法的复杂性,并在美国国税局已经在不合规负担下挣扎的情况下,增加避税的激励和机会。最后,如果实际问题不够有说服力,本文将在理论基础上研究如何最好地评估已婚夫妇的纳税能力。它认为,在将已婚纳税人与其他纳税人进行比较时,以一元为基础的计算仍然更准确,而夫妻之间的比较,而不是夫妻内部的比较,反映了相对的支付能力。综上所述,本文认为共同申报仍是最佳的申报单位。
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To Have and To Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to do with Joint Tax Filing?
Wealthy taxpayers have always attempted to reduce their federal income taxes. Before 1948, one popular method was to shift income between spouses so that more of a husband’s income could be reported by, and taxed to, his lower-income, and thus lower tax bracket, wife. In 1948 Congress removed married couples’ incentive to engage in this tax avoidance behavior by adding nationalized income-splitting to the joint return. This effectively gave those filing joint returns tax brackets that were twice as wide as those of single taxpayers, and, as a result, married couples with a single or primary income-earner paid relatively less income tax than their single counterparts. Today there is debate over returning to an individual-based income tax system, similar to that which operated before 1948. Evaluating that proposal, this paper first explores the development of the income-splitting joint return to evaluate the potential costs and consequences of a return to an individual system. Individual-filing incentivized avoidance behavior, reducing the progressiveness of the income tax while giving tax advantages to those who engaged in tax-planning and an increased relative tax burden to those who did not. Second, the paper considers the prospect of the Internal Revenue Service reining in a renewal of this type of tax avoidance today. Returning to a system of individual filing will increase complexity in the tax code and add incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance at a time when the IRS is already struggling under the burden of non-compliance. Finally, in case practical concerns are not persuasive enough, this paper examines how best to evaluate married couples’ ability to pay taxes on a theoretical basis. Calculations on a unitary basis, it contends, remain more accurate for comparing married taxpayers to other taxpayers and it is that comparison, between couples as opposed to within couples, which reflects relative abilities to pay. As a result of these considerations, this paper concludes that joint filing remains the best filing unit.
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