Towards a New Phase in Relations with the European Union

Some analysts are sceptical about the success of the resumed negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Cuba, as neither of the parties has waived their starting positions. Indeed, Europe has reiterated that 'this is not a change in the previous policy. As we support reform and modernization in Cuba, we have consistently raised our concerns about human rights, which will remain at the centre of this relationship'.2 As stated, 'Cuba will consider the invitation from the European side, in a respectful, constructive manner and remain bound to its sovereignty and national interests'.3However, the mere fact that these negotiations had commenced shows that both Brussels and Havana are prioritising pragmatism and a willingness to create meaningful economic and trade relations facilitated and channelled through a legal instrument.Of these diplomatic steps several questions arise: What are the interests of Cuba in its relations with the EU and which policy has been followed to bring them about? What are the interests of the EU and how it has sought to achieve them? How important is it for Cuba to advance negotiations at this time when the Common Position adopted by the EU in 1996 remains in force? What are the prospects?Interests and Politics between Cuba and the EUWhen Washington imposed the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, American leaders had hoped that their allies would add to these measures. However, one after another, from Canada to Japan and Western Europe, they refused and cooperated with revolutionary Cuba in different ways and forms.4Given its composition, uniqueness and constant widening and deepening, negotiations with the EU have always been complex. The EU is not a state but a group that initially comprised 6 Western European nations that today is a motley collection of 28 members including the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. If it is a commonplace in international relations to not consider states as rational actors, it is much less the case with the EU, which has been described by one of its most respected historical leaders, Frenchman Jacques Delors, as an 'unidentified political object'. To this should be added the confusing institutional framework in which competing intergovernmental bodies (such as the European Council and its subsidiary bodies) and the supranational (such as the Commission, Parliament or the Supreme Court) do not always operate in perfect harmony.Goran Therborn has speculated that in the contemporary EU three, not necessarily antagonistic, trends are emerging: a global trading power, unconditional ally of the US5 and 'global Scandinavia'. According to him, the EU is these three things at once and behaves interchangeably depending on the topic in question.6It is no wonder the path of the process of finding an agreement between Cuba and the EU has been long and thorny. It is a simplification (which some Cuban colleagues incur) to attribute the difficulties and obstacles to a single factor - in particular the close relations between the EU and the US. The situation is much more complex. In this at least the following four key variables play a part:1. The perception of the Cuban authorities of their own economic, political and social situation and the importance the relationship with the EU may have, within the system of international relations, in terms of cost/benefit. In other words, to assess whether the economic and political benefits of relating to this powerful bloc outweigh the cost that could be generated by an asymmetrical contractual relationship submitted to the pressures of 'democratic conditionality and human rights' - an EU double standard of which there is sufficient evidence.In this position two trends may be seen: one that believes that the EU can maintain an independent policy towards Cuba, despite its alliance with the US and another which judges its policy as inevitably subordinated to Cuba's northern neighbour in a negative role. …