为内容付费还是为推荐付费?内容定价的实证研究

Xintong Han, Pu Zhao
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文研究了当驻留平台给予在线内容提供商完全的定价自主权并允许推荐计划以获取受众时,在线内容提供商如何将其内容货币化。通过使用来自一个流行的中国内容提供平台的独特数据,我们使用结构化方法来模拟内容提供商的定价和推荐营销决策。估计结果突出了推荐计划的权衡:它有助于吸引更多的观众,但会导致推荐费用的收入损失。反事实分析表明,平台政策变化可能导致内容提供的潜在同质化和巨大的需求损失。
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Pay for Content or Pay for Referral? An Empirical Study on Content Pricing
This paper examines how online content providers monetize their content when the residing platform gives them full pricing autonomy and allows referral program for their audience acquisition. By using unique data from a popular Chinese content provision platform, we use a structural approach to model a content provider’s pricing and referral marketing decisions. The estimation results highlight the trade-off of the referral program: it helps attract more audience but incurs revenue loss from referral payments. The counterfactual analyses show that platform policy change may cause potential homogeneity of content provision and huge demand loss.
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