{"title":"专才vs通才:多任务处理的效率","authors":"Clemens Buchen, Jenny Kragl, Alberto Palermo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3716998","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We show that under multitasking — where tasks can be substitutes or complements — a specialist worker with an uneven skill distribution can outperform a generalist with higher average skills. We use a principal–agent model to study worker efficiency and welfare. The main result is robust if a rent-efficiency trade-off is added.","PeriodicalId":210669,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Human Capital eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking\",\"authors\":\"Clemens Buchen, Jenny Kragl, Alberto Palermo\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3716998\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We show that under multitasking — where tasks can be substitutes or complements — a specialist worker with an uneven skill distribution can outperform a generalist with higher average skills. We use a principal–agent model to study worker efficiency and welfare. The main result is robust if a rent-efficiency trade-off is added.\",\"PeriodicalId\":210669,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Labor: Human Capital eJournal\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Labor: Human Capital eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716998\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Labor: Human Capital eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716998","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking
Abstract We show that under multitasking — where tasks can be substitutes or complements — a specialist worker with an uneven skill distribution can outperform a generalist with higher average skills. We use a principal–agent model to study worker efficiency and welfare. The main result is robust if a rent-efficiency trade-off is added.