{"title":"管理者冒险激励与高管股票期权再定价:基于美国赌场高管的研究","authors":"D. A. Rogers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.303781","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk as well as stock price, firms must be cognizant that executives may increasingly face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects, as options go underwater. Repricing may serve as a mechanism to alleviate such incentives. The study examines repricing activity by firms in the U.S. gaming industry during 1993-1998. I find that, in both firm-level and executive-level analyses, risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results are supportive of the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"32","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of Us Casino Executives\",\"authors\":\"D. A. Rogers\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.303781\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this study, I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk as well as stock price, firms must be cognizant that executives may increasingly face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects, as options go underwater. Repricing may serve as a mechanism to alleviate such incentives. The study examines repricing activity by firms in the U.S. gaming industry during 1993-1998. I find that, in both firm-level and executive-level analyses, risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results are supportive of the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.\",\"PeriodicalId\":180033,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting Abstracts\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"32\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting Abstracts\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303781\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303781","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of Us Casino Executives
In this study, I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk as well as stock price, firms must be cognizant that executives may increasingly face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects, as options go underwater. Repricing may serve as a mechanism to alleviate such incentives. The study examines repricing activity by firms in the U.S. gaming industry during 1993-1998. I find that, in both firm-level and executive-level analyses, risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results are supportive of the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.