政治关系、刺激支出分配和就业乘数

Joonkyu Choi, Veronika Penciakova, Felipe E. Saffie
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们利用《美国复苏与再投资法案》(ARRA)的数据表明,企业利用其政治关系赢得刺激拨款,而通过有政治关系的企业输送的公共支出阻碍了就业创造。我们建立了一个独特的数据库,将竞选捐款和州立法选举结果与ARRA拨款分配联系起来。利用基于在ARRA之前举行的前后接近选举的政治关系的外生变化,我们偶然发现,有政治关系的公司获得拨款的可能性高出64%。基于工具变量方法,我们还确定,通过有政治关系的公司提供的赠款所创造的州级就业为零。因此,财政刺激的影响不仅取决于支出的多少,还取决于支出如何在接受者之间分配。
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Political Connections, Allocation of Stimulus Spending, and the Jobs Multiplier
Using American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) data, we show that firms lever their political connections to win stimulus grants and public expenditure channeled through politically connected firms hinders job creation. We build a unique database that links campaign contributions and state legislative election outcomes to ARRA grant allocation. Using exogenous variation in political connections based on ex-post close elections held before ARRA, we causally show that politically connected firms are 64 percent more likely to secure a grant. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we also establish that state-level employment creation associated with grants channeled through politically connected firms is nil. Therefore, the impact of fiscal stimulus is not only determined by how much is spent, but also by how the expenditure is allocated across recipients.
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