基于拍卖的5G RAN网络切片

L. M. M. Zorello, Kazem Eradatmand, Sebastian Troia, A. Pattavina, Yingqian Zhang, G. Maier
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引用次数: 0

摘要

网络切片是5G/6G网络的一个重要特性,它可以提高灵活性,并在单个基础设施上实现不同的应用程序。将物理资源进行分区,创建虚拟网络,每个虚拟网络用于满足特定需求的业务。参与网络切片的实体包括移动网络运营商(MNOs)、移动虚拟网络运营商(MVNOs)和用户。MNO拥有物理网络基础设施和资源。mvno从MNO租用资源,并作为服务提供商对其用户进行操作。本工作的目标是优化端到端网络切片过程,以公平的资源共享方式为用户提供服务。我们将这一问题建模为带有改进的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves定价机制的分层组合拍卖。在高级拍卖中,MNO是向几个mvno提供网络切片的卖方,这些mvno充当竞标者。在较低级别的拍卖中,每个MVNO作为向其订阅的最终用户提供服务的卖方举行拍卖,而最终用户则扮演竞标者的角色。我们使用数学规划和启发式算法来制定和解决赢家判定问题。仿真结果表明,该模型能够实现资源的公平共享,提高了MNO和MVNO的收益。
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Auction-based network slicing for 5G RAN
Network slicing is an important characteristic of 5G/6G networks that increases flexibility and enables different applications over a single infrastructure. The physical resources are partitioned to create virtualized networks, each dedicated to services with specific requirements. Several entities participate in network slicing, including Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and users. An MNO owns the physical network infrastructure and the resources. MVNOs lease resources from the MNO and operate as service providers towards their subscribers. The goal of this work is to optimize the end-to-end network slicing process to provide services to users with a fair sharing of resources. We model this problem as a hierarchical combinatorial auction with a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism. In the upper-level auction, an MNO is the seller supplying Network Slice to several MVNOs, who act as the bidders. In the lower-level auction, each MVNO holds an auction as a seller delivering services to their subscribed end-users, who play the role of bidders. We formulate and solve the Winner Determination Problem using mathematical programming and heuristic algorithms. The simulations show that the model can achieve fair sharing of resources, and it enables improving the MNO and MVNO revenue.
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