网络时间安全中的隐蔽通道

Kevin Lamshöft, J. Dittmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

RFC8915中规定的NTS (Network Time Security)是一种以NTP (Network Time Protocol)为基础,为时钟同步提供加密安全的机制。通过使用TLS (Transport Layer Security)和AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data)技术,NTS可以保证服务器和客户端同步时间的完整性和真实性。然而,过去的研究表明,时间同步协议,如网络时间协议(NTP)和精确时间协议(PTP)可能被用作隐蔽通道的载体,潜在地渗透或泄露信息,或在恶意软件感染的情况下用作命令和控制通道。通过系统地分析NTS规范,我们确定了12个潜在的隐蔽通道,并在本文中进行了描述和讨论。从12个通道中,我们选择了一种客户端方法,使用NTS随机uid进行概念验证实现。此外,我们分析和调查了潜在的对策,并提出了一种能够减轻本文中描述的隐蔽通道的主动监狱长的设计。
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Covert Channels in Network Time Security
Network Time Security (NTS) specified in RFC8915 is a mechanism to provide cryptographic security for clock synchronization using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) as foundation. By using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) NTS is able to ensure integrity and authenticity between server and clients synchronizing time. However, in the past it was shown that time synchronisation protocols such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) and the Precision Time Protocol (PTP) might be leveraged as carrier for covert channels, potentially infiltrating or exfiltrating information or to be used as Command-and-Control channels in case of malware infections. By systematically analyzing the NTS specification, we identified 12 potential covert channels, which we describe and discuss in this paper. From the 12 channels, we exemplary selected an client-side approach for a proof-of-concept implementation using NTS random UIDs. Further, we analyze and investigate potential countermeasures and propose a design for an active warden capable of mitigating the covert channels described in this paper.
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