cac的工作:下一步是什么?

Andrés de la Cruz, Ignacio Lagos
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2020年,阿根廷和厄瓜多尔率先使用2014年发布的国际资本市场标准集体行动条款(ICMA CACs)中包含的交叉序列汇总特征进行债务重组。两国的法律战略明确了两个特点:(i)“重新指定”(即发行人有可能在债券持有人同意的情况下,重新定义为合并目的而考虑的债券系列池);以及(ii)按顺序使用ICMA cac中设想的聚合方法(称为“吃豆人”)。在主权债务重组中,这两个特征的结合可能会导致主权国家依赖少数债权人,最终约束和重组多数债权人。这种新发现的灵活性最初导致债权人团体要求消除重新指定的可能性,并完全删除ICMA在2014年从阿根廷债券文件中引入的创新。最终,阿根廷和厄瓜多尔说服其债权人允许重新指定,并循序渐进地使用综合方法,并提议调整ICMA CACs,引入某些限制,以排除主权国家在其最初提议未能获得有意义的多数支持的情况下对所有债权人实施重组的可能性。本文描述了阿根廷和厄瓜多尔债务重组的条款和过程,并认为(i)在某些情况下,禁止主权国家“重新指定”的负面影响超过了重新指定的好处,因为它可能会将重组变成一场“全有或全无”的游戏,进一步使债权人之间的动态复杂化;(ii)在一定范围内依次使用不同的汇总方法的能力,也推进了ICMA CACs的目标。
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CACs at Work: What Next?
In 2020, Argentina and Ecuador were the first sovereigns to conduct a debt restructuring using the cross series aggregation feature included in the International Capital Market’s standard Collective Action Clauses (ICMA CACs), published in 2014. The legal strategy of both countries articulated two features: (i) “re-designation” (ie, the possibility for the issuer, with bondholder consent, to re-define the pool of bond series to be considered for aggregation purposes); and (ii) the sequential use of the aggregation methods contemplated in the ICMA CACs (dubbed the “Pac-Man”). The combination of these two features in a sovereign debt workout could hypothetically result in a sovereign relying on a minority of its creditors to ultimately bind and restructure a majority. This new found flexibility initially led the creditor community to demand the eradication of the possibility to re-designate and the complete removal of the innovations introduced by ICMA in 2014 from Argentina’s bond documentation. Ultimately, Argentina and Ecuador persuaded their creditors to permit re-designation, as well as the sequential use of aggregation methods, and proposed adjusting the ICMA CACs by introducing certain limits that would foreclose the possibility for a sovereign to effect a restructuring over all creditors if its original offer failed to attract the support of a meaningful majority.

This article describes the terms and processes of the Argentine and Ecuadorian debt workouts and argues that (i) in certain cases, the downside of prohibiting a sovereign from “re-designating” outweighs the benefits of re-designation, as it may turn a restructuring into an “all-or-nothing” game, further complicating inter-creditor dynamics, and (ii) the ability to use different aggregation methods sequentially, within certain limits, also advances the objectives of the ICMA CACs.
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