{"title":"无线传感器网络中移动sink的假事件检测","authors":"Y. Sei, Akihiko Ohsuga","doi":"10.1109/EISIC.2013.15","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In large-scale sensor networks, adversaries may capture and compromise several of the sensors. Compromised nodes can be used by adversaries to generate many false messages which waste the batteries of sensor nodes and the bandwidth of the sensor network. Many works aim to detect a false event in-network even if many nodes are compromised. Certain existing methods can achieve this, but, they cannot be used in a situation where the location of the sink changes. We propose a new method that resiliently detects false messages, even when there are a large number of compromised nodes and that can handle situations where the location of the sink changes. By preloading a legitimate combination of keys (LCK) on sensor nodes before deployment, the nodes can detect false events created from false combinations of keys. Our mathematical analysis and the simulations we conducted prove the effectiveness of our method.","PeriodicalId":229195,"journal":{"name":"2013 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"False Event Detection for Mobile Sinks in Wireless Sensor Networks\",\"authors\":\"Y. Sei, Akihiko Ohsuga\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/EISIC.2013.15\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In large-scale sensor networks, adversaries may capture and compromise several of the sensors. Compromised nodes can be used by adversaries to generate many false messages which waste the batteries of sensor nodes and the bandwidth of the sensor network. Many works aim to detect a false event in-network even if many nodes are compromised. Certain existing methods can achieve this, but, they cannot be used in a situation where the location of the sink changes. We propose a new method that resiliently detects false messages, even when there are a large number of compromised nodes and that can handle situations where the location of the sink changes. By preloading a legitimate combination of keys (LCK) on sensor nodes before deployment, the nodes can detect false events created from false combinations of keys. Our mathematical analysis and the simulations we conducted prove the effectiveness of our method.\",\"PeriodicalId\":229195,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference\",\"volume\":\"2014 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-08-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/EISIC.2013.15\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EISIC.2013.15","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
False Event Detection for Mobile Sinks in Wireless Sensor Networks
In large-scale sensor networks, adversaries may capture and compromise several of the sensors. Compromised nodes can be used by adversaries to generate many false messages which waste the batteries of sensor nodes and the bandwidth of the sensor network. Many works aim to detect a false event in-network even if many nodes are compromised. Certain existing methods can achieve this, but, they cannot be used in a situation where the location of the sink changes. We propose a new method that resiliently detects false messages, even when there are a large number of compromised nodes and that can handle situations where the location of the sink changes. By preloading a legitimate combination of keys (LCK) on sensor nodes before deployment, the nodes can detect false events created from false combinations of keys. Our mathematical analysis and the simulations we conducted prove the effectiveness of our method.