认识论的优势

Amie L. Thomasson
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摘要

本章认为,接受模态规范主义具有显著的认识论优势。那些试图解释模态知识的人面临着整合的挑战,既要调和了解模态真理所涉及的内容,又要协调一个关于我们如何能够了解它们的可信故事,以及解释我们如何能够进化到拥有了解模态真理的可靠能力的可靠性挑战。最近的经验主义对模态知识的解释不能解决这些关于形而上学模态真理的问题,这使我们面临着对大部分形而上学持怀疑态度的威胁。然而,通过给出一个不同的功能故事,模态规范主义者可以对模态认识论中这两个经典问题的其余版本做出合理的回应。模态规范主义者还可以回应与莎朗·斯特在元伦理学中提出的进化论揭穿论点类似的进一步担忧。
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Epistemological Advantages
This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of explaining how we could have evolved to have a reliable faculty for coming to know modal truths. Recent empiricist accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics. However, by giving a different functional story, the modal normativist can develop a plausible response to the remaining versions of both of these classic problems for modal epistemology. Modal normativists can also respond to further worries parallel to those raised by Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics.
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Methodological Advantages Epistemological Advantages Ontological Advantages Conclusion
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