{"title":"后记","authors":"Adam Cox, Cristina M. Rodríguez","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190694364.003.0010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This epilogue explores the justifications for a radical reimagination of the immigration system—for an immigration law and politics that shrinks the domain of enforcement and limits the scope of executive power exercised through coercion. In a reconstituted regime, the Executive should not be sidelined, but rather delegated a different set of authorities. The system of de facto delegation that has driven immigration policymaking for two generations should be brought above board, supplanted by a model of de jure delegation. Doing so would retain a central role for the President in setting immigration policy but would marginalize the enforcement imperative at the heart of the current regime and place presidential immigration law on a footing that more closely resembles other arenas of the modern regulatory state. In order to begin this process, Congress must first drastically decrease the number of people who live under the perpetual threat of enforcement. A reform strategy must therefore begin with a legalization initiative for the current unauthorized population.","PeriodicalId":170336,"journal":{"name":"The President and Immigration Law","volume":"os-13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Epilogue\",\"authors\":\"Adam Cox, Cristina M. Rodríguez\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190694364.003.0010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This epilogue explores the justifications for a radical reimagination of the immigration system—for an immigration law and politics that shrinks the domain of enforcement and limits the scope of executive power exercised through coercion. In a reconstituted regime, the Executive should not be sidelined, but rather delegated a different set of authorities. The system of de facto delegation that has driven immigration policymaking for two generations should be brought above board, supplanted by a model of de jure delegation. Doing so would retain a central role for the President in setting immigration policy but would marginalize the enforcement imperative at the heart of the current regime and place presidential immigration law on a footing that more closely resembles other arenas of the modern regulatory state. In order to begin this process, Congress must first drastically decrease the number of people who live under the perpetual threat of enforcement. A reform strategy must therefore begin with a legalization initiative for the current unauthorized population.\",\"PeriodicalId\":170336,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The President and Immigration Law\",\"volume\":\"os-13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The President and Immigration Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190694364.003.0010\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The President and Immigration Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190694364.003.0010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This epilogue explores the justifications for a radical reimagination of the immigration system—for an immigration law and politics that shrinks the domain of enforcement and limits the scope of executive power exercised through coercion. In a reconstituted regime, the Executive should not be sidelined, but rather delegated a different set of authorities. The system of de facto delegation that has driven immigration policymaking for two generations should be brought above board, supplanted by a model of de jure delegation. Doing so would retain a central role for the President in setting immigration policy but would marginalize the enforcement imperative at the heart of the current regime and place presidential immigration law on a footing that more closely resembles other arenas of the modern regulatory state. In order to begin this process, Congress must first drastically decrease the number of people who live under the perpetual threat of enforcement. A reform strategy must therefore begin with a legalization initiative for the current unauthorized population.