INTERSUBJETIVIDAD E INDIVIDUACIÓN EN HUSSERL Y HABERMAS: DE LA NECESIDAD DE UN CAMBIO DE PARADIGMA A LA COMPLEMENTACIÓN

This article reconstructs, from a critical perspective, Habermas’ objections developed in the Theory of Communicative Action and its complementary writings, to Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity. For the author, the construction of a theory of society requires a paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language, with the subsequent abandonment of references to all solipsist starting points. Precisely, from the Habermasian perspective, the problem of the origin of self-con-sciousness finds its solution by referring to the social activity in which the subject is involved. The individuation of the subject is formed at the level of linguistic intersubjectivity: the context of interaction precedes the emergence of individual perspectives about experiences. The current investigation exposes that Habermas’ theory fails to show that self-perception of the subject is entirely generated by social relations. In fact, it is not possible to avoid the primary sense of identity that Husserl has designated as the pole of action and affection. The aporias of the Habermasian theory show the need to reestablish a dialogue with transcendental phenomenology, which does not start from a paradigm shift, an abandonment of the philosophy of consciousness, but from the possibility of a mutual enrichment between both theoretical proposals. In conclusion, a philosophy of the subject constitutes a necessary condition to elucidate the intersubjectivity and the institution of the