提前销售如何降低利润:什么时候买,什么时候卖,收取什么价格

A. Glazer, Refael Hassin, Irit Nowik
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引用次数: 0

摘要

问题定义:考虑那些喜欢晚消费而不是早消费的消费者。如果价格不变,那么我们可以预期消费者会等待购买商品。如果消费者担心其他人会提前购买商品,这样就会出现短缺,那么这种说法就站不住脚了。当消费者担心短缺时,他们什么时候会来?垄断者的利润最大化政策是什么?公司是否会因为提前销售而损失利润?消费者到达的时间得到了很多研究。然而,很少有人考虑到预期的短缺会如何影响到达时间。这个应用很重要:管理者想知道消费者什么时候会来,他们什么时候应该提供产品,以及收取什么价格才能使利润最大化。方法/结果:我们使用博弈论。我们分析单个商品出售时的分析结果:我们给出均衡顾客行为和利润最大化企业战略的封闭解,并进行敏感性分析。对于多单位的推广,我们给出了一些解析结果,并给出了许多数值解。如果价格在一段时间内保持不变,那么即使这样做没有运营成本,提前销售也会减少利润。然而,如果公司必须同时提供提前销售和后期销售,那么利润最大化的价格会导致所有人同时到达(或早或晚,取决于参数)。销售单位数量的增加增加了利润最大化的价格,增加了公司的预期利润。消费者的均衡策略会产生一些意想不到的行为。到货率可能随着商品价格的增加而增加。对于给定的价格,销售数量的增加会增加提前到达的消费者数量。管理启示:公司应该只在消费者最需要的时候提供产品,而不是更早。此外,从我们的分析中可以得出利润最大化的价格。这个价格并不是使预期到达人数最大化的价格。资助:本研究由以色列科学基金会资助[Grant 852/22]。补充材料:在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1218上获得。
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How Advance Sales Can Reduce Profits: When to Buy, When to Sell, and What Price to Charge
Problem definition: Consider consumers who prefer to consume a good later rather than earlier. If the price is constant, then we would expect consumers to wait to buy the good. That does not hold if consumers are concerned that others will buy the good early, so that a shortage will later occur. When will consumers arrive when they fear a shortage? What is the profit-maximizing policy of a monopolist? Might the firm lose profits by offering advance sales? The timing of consumer arrivals is much studied. Little consideration, however, has addressed how anticipated shortages affect arrival times. The application is important: managers want to know when consumers will arrive, when they should make the product available, and what price to charge to maximize profits. Methodology/results: We use game theory. We analyze analytically outcomes when a single item is for sale: we give closed solutions for the equilibrium customer behavior and profit-maximizing firm strategy and conduct sensitivity analysis. For generalization concerning more than one unit, we give some analytical results and provide many numerical solutions. When the price is constant over time, then even with no operating cost of doing so, offering advance sales reduces profits. If, however, the firm must offer both advance sales and later sales, then the profit-maximizing price induces all arrivals at the same time (either early or late, depending on the parameters). An increase in the number of units offered for sale increases the profit-maximizing price and increases the firm’s expected profit. The equilibrium strategy of consumers can generate some unexpected behavior. The arrival rate may increase with the price of the good. For a given price, an increase in the number of units for sale increases the number of consumers who arrive early. Managerial implications: The firm should offer the good only at the time consumers most desire it, and not earlier. Additionally, the profit-maximizing price can be derived from our analysis. This price is not the price which maximizes the expected number of arrivals. Funding: This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 852/22]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1218 .
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