{"title":"组合安全和系统工程的标准:指定组件的规范方法","authors":"E. Verhulst, B. Sputh","doi":"10.1109/ISSREW.2013.6688861","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable processes for system development. Nevertheless, safety standards differences from distinct domains are non-negligible. We focus in particular on the aviation, automotive and railway standards, all related to the transportation market. We argue that the Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement for developing a safety critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users into deeper account. In addition safety engineering standards provide very little guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the established engineering practice. We develop a novel normative concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety Integrity Level concept. An important difference is that it requires a component to carry a contract and the supporting evidence. ARRL can make a significant contribution to foster cross-domain safety engineering.","PeriodicalId":332420,"journal":{"name":"2013 IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ARRL: A criterion for compositional safety and systems engineering: A normative approach to specifying components\",\"authors\":\"E. Verhulst, B. Sputh\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ISSREW.2013.6688861\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable processes for system development. Nevertheless, safety standards differences from distinct domains are non-negligible. We focus in particular on the aviation, automotive and railway standards, all related to the transportation market. We argue that the Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement for developing a safety critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users into deeper account. In addition safety engineering standards provide very little guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the established engineering practice. We develop a novel normative concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety Integrity Level concept. An important difference is that it requires a component to carry a contract and the supporting evidence. ARRL can make a significant contribution to foster cross-domain safety engineering.\",\"PeriodicalId\":332420,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSREW.2013.6688861\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSREW.2013.6688861","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
ARRL: A criterion for compositional safety and systems engineering: A normative approach to specifying components
Safety engineering standards define rigorous and controllable processes for system development. Nevertheless, safety standards differences from distinct domains are non-negligible. We focus in particular on the aviation, automotive and railway standards, all related to the transportation market. We argue that the Safety Integrity Levels are not sufficient to be used as a top level requirement for developing a safety critical system. We argue that Quality of Service is a more generic criterion that takes the trustworthiness as perceived by users into deeper account. In addition safety engineering standards provide very little guidance on how to compose safe systems from components, while this is the established engineering practice. We develop a novel normative concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level as a criterion that takes the industrial practice into account and show how it complements the Safety Integrity Level concept. An important difference is that it requires a component to carry a contract and the supporting evidence. ARRL can make a significant contribution to foster cross-domain safety engineering.