竞争与创新政策中的制度优势

Herbert Hovenkamp
{"title":"竞争与创新政策中的制度优势","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2307141","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such. Since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that implicate patent law. Over the next century patent/antitrust policy veered between extremes, from periods characterized by heavy deference to patent practices, even where they seemed obviously anticompetitive, to periods in which the courts viewed patents as little more than a nuisance and used every opportunity to apply the antitrust laws against them. This brief essay addresses the question of relative institutional advantage in cases where both competitive harm and harm to innovation are relevant but patent and antitrust approaches differ widely and are likely to reach different conclusions.","PeriodicalId":431712,"journal":{"name":"University of Iowa College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy\",\"authors\":\"Herbert Hovenkamp\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2307141\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such. Since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that implicate patent law. Over the next century patent/antitrust policy veered between extremes, from periods characterized by heavy deference to patent practices, even where they seemed obviously anticompetitive, to periods in which the courts viewed patents as little more than a nuisance and used every opportunity to apply the antitrust laws against them. This brief essay addresses the question of relative institutional advantage in cases where both competitive harm and harm to innovation are relevant but patent and antitrust approaches differ widely and are likely to reach different conclusions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431712,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Iowa College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-09-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Iowa College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2307141\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Iowa College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2307141","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在美国,创新政策和竞争政策的责任被分配给具有不同权力的不同机构。专利政策的主要机构执行者是美国专利商标局(USPTO)、国际贸易委员会(ITC)和由美国联邦巡回上诉法院监督的联邦地区法院,最终是最高法院。虽然竞争政策不是专利政策的明确组成部分,但竞争问题经常出现,即使它们不被视为如此。自20世纪初以来,反垄断法院不得不面对涉及专利法的做法。在接下来的一个世纪里,专利/反垄断政策在两个极端之间摇摆不定,从以严格尊重专利实践为特征的时期,即使它们看起来明显是反竞争的,到法院认为专利只不过是一种妨害,并利用一切机会适用反托拉斯法来对付它们的时期。在竞争损害和对创新的损害都是相关的情况下,这篇简短的文章解决了相对制度优势的问题,但专利和反垄断的方法差异很大,可能会得出不同的结论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy
In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such. Since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that implicate patent law. Over the next century patent/antitrust policy veered between extremes, from periods characterized by heavy deference to patent practices, even where they seemed obviously anticompetitive, to periods in which the courts viewed patents as little more than a nuisance and used every opportunity to apply the antitrust laws against them. This brief essay addresses the question of relative institutional advantage in cases where both competitive harm and harm to innovation are relevant but patent and antitrust approaches differ widely and are likely to reach different conclusions.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The Independent Board as Shield The Malleability of Patent Rights Disuniformity Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy Innovation and Competition Policy, Ch. 9 (2d ed): The Innovation Commons
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1