{"title":"书讨论","authors":"Igor Logvinenko","doi":"10.30965/22142290-00702004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Corruption as a Last Resort is an impressive study that makes new and important contributions to the scholarship on corruption in Central Asia and across a broader range of low-income countries. The book is a powerful critique of market liberalization policies of the past two decades. McMann’s research points to a strong connection between market reform and the prevalence of corruption, especially in the context of state interventionist legacy and underdeveloped market-enhancing institutions. The connection between market reform and individual behavior that McMann uncovers runs against the expectations of those who have promoted market reforms in transition economies. The argument advanced in the book suggests that instead of reducing the role of the state in the economy, failed market reform created an environment in which individuals caught in difficult economic circumstances turned to petty corruption as their last resort. Reforms increased popular demand for corrupt behavior by state officials. Lacking market opportunities or personal networks, individuals resorted to patronage-based relationships with state officials. Corruption as the Last Resort is an ambitious project that not only introduces a novel theoretical framework, but also marshals impressive evidence (original survey and interview data) to support it. For example, in McMann’s nuanced theory, market reform is especially harmful to the welfare of the poorest citizens when there has been a long history of state involvement in the economy. In other words, reduction in redistributionist policies results in fewer funds directed to the neediest citizens; the people who previously relied the most on government aid. The weak market-enhancing institutions so common in the post-socialist transition context preclude the creation of market alternatives to the state, leaving no alternatives to petty corruption.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Book Discussion\",\"authors\":\"Igor Logvinenko\",\"doi\":\"10.30965/22142290-00702004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Corruption as a Last Resort is an impressive study that makes new and important contributions to the scholarship on corruption in Central Asia and across a broader range of low-income countries. The book is a powerful critique of market liberalization policies of the past two decades. McMann’s research points to a strong connection between market reform and the prevalence of corruption, especially in the context of state interventionist legacy and underdeveloped market-enhancing institutions. The connection between market reform and individual behavior that McMann uncovers runs against the expectations of those who have promoted market reforms in transition economies. The argument advanced in the book suggests that instead of reducing the role of the state in the economy, failed market reform created an environment in which individuals caught in difficult economic circumstances turned to petty corruption as their last resort. Reforms increased popular demand for corrupt behavior by state officials. Lacking market opportunities or personal networks, individuals resorted to patronage-based relationships with state officials. Corruption as the Last Resort is an ambitious project that not only introduces a novel theoretical framework, but also marshals impressive evidence (original survey and interview data) to support it. For example, in McMann’s nuanced theory, market reform is especially harmful to the welfare of the poorest citizens when there has been a long history of state involvement in the economy. In other words, reduction in redistributionist policies results in fewer funds directed to the neediest citizens; the people who previously relied the most on government aid. The weak market-enhancing institutions so common in the post-socialist transition context preclude the creation of market alternatives to the state, leaving no alternatives to petty corruption.\",\"PeriodicalId\":351033,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Central Asian Affairs\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Central Asian Affairs\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-00702004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Central Asian Affairs","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-00702004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption as a Last Resort is an impressive study that makes new and important contributions to the scholarship on corruption in Central Asia and across a broader range of low-income countries. The book is a powerful critique of market liberalization policies of the past two decades. McMann’s research points to a strong connection between market reform and the prevalence of corruption, especially in the context of state interventionist legacy and underdeveloped market-enhancing institutions. The connection between market reform and individual behavior that McMann uncovers runs against the expectations of those who have promoted market reforms in transition economies. The argument advanced in the book suggests that instead of reducing the role of the state in the economy, failed market reform created an environment in which individuals caught in difficult economic circumstances turned to petty corruption as their last resort. Reforms increased popular demand for corrupt behavior by state officials. Lacking market opportunities or personal networks, individuals resorted to patronage-based relationships with state officials. Corruption as the Last Resort is an ambitious project that not only introduces a novel theoretical framework, but also marshals impressive evidence (original survey and interview data) to support it. For example, in McMann’s nuanced theory, market reform is especially harmful to the welfare of the poorest citizens when there has been a long history of state involvement in the economy. In other words, reduction in redistributionist policies results in fewer funds directed to the neediest citizens; the people who previously relied the most on government aid. The weak market-enhancing institutions so common in the post-socialist transition context preclude the creation of market alternatives to the state, leaving no alternatives to petty corruption.