后凯恩斯公共预算与财政:评估现代货币理论的贡献

R. Kravchuk
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引用次数: 1

摘要

虽然现代货币理论(MMT)提供了值得认真考虑的贡献,但为了将MMT与既定的预算文献联系起来,可能需要一些额外的理论构建和与现有理论的综合。MMT主要关注货币主权政府。这些政府面临着极其“软”的预算限制,因为它们:发行和调节本国货币的价值,拥有作为政府国库财政代理人的中央银行,能够发行以本国货币计价的主权债务,并在一个自由浮动的货币汇率体系中运作,货币和资本管制最少。根据这些标准,拥有主权的国家政府能够在到期时偿还所有债务,几乎不考虑其未偿债务的水平;不能强迫他们违背自己的意愿违约。它们在宏观经济上也是自主的。这些状况准确地描述了美国联邦政府的财政状况,这正是研讨会论文的集体立场。因此,美国政府超软预算约束的存在是建立在联邦政府所受的极其有利的货币和信贷条件的基础上的,事实上,这是它自第二次世界大战以来为自己创造和培育的。一个重要的暗示是,联邦层面的预算文献不能忽视宏观经济学和主权货币制度的管理,也不能忽视使其解体的货币经济学,否则就会受到不现实主义的指责。
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Post‐Keynesian Public Budgeting & Finance: Assessing Contributions from Modern Monetary Theory
While Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) offers contributions that are worthy of serious consideration, some additional theory‐building and synthesis with existing theory may be in order to tie MMT into the established budgeting literature. MMT focuses primarily on monetarily sovereign governments. These are governments that face extremely “soft” budget constraints insofar as they: issue and regulate the value of their own currencies, possess central banks that function as the fiscal agents of their government treasuries, are able to issue sovereign debt denominated in their domestic currency, and operate in a system of freely‐floating currency exchange rates, with a minimum of currency and capital controls. National governments that are sovereign according to these criteria are able to make all debt service payments as they come due, virtually without regard to their level of outstanding debt; they cannot be forced to default against their will. They are also macroeconomically‐autonomous. It is the collective position of the symposium papers that these conditions describe, in precise terms, the fiscal position of the U.S. federal government. As such, the existence of an ultra‐soft U.S. government budget constraint is grounded in the extremely favorable conditions of money and credit that the federal government is subject to, and which in fact it has created and nurtured for itself since the Second World War. An important implication is that the federal level budgeting literature cannot ignore the macroeconomics and the administration of a sovereign currency regime, nor the monetary economics that ungirds it, without sustaining charges of unrealism.
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