智能电网中居民用电最优定价策略研究

Quan-Hui Liu, Ying Zhou, Zhongtao Yue, Bidushi Barua, Yanru Zhang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

电力零售商提供了各种各样的公用事业计划,希望增加的竞争能降低价格,改善服务,提供创新的产品。本文提出了智能电网中零售电力供应商(REP)住宅用户的最优定价策略,其中REP为不同需求的用户提供多种公用事业计划,包括固定费率计划、多阶段计划和一次性收费计划。住宅用户通过考虑自己的需求和三种方案的定价策略来选择自己收益最大化的公用事业方案。另一方面,REP通过根据住宅客户的决定精心设计定价策略来优化其利润。为了深入了解这样一个高度耦合的系统,我们考虑一个具有一个REP和一组需要电力的客户的系统。我们提出了一个三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,其中REP作为领导者在阶段I决定提供的具体方案,然后在阶段II宣布每个方案的价格,最后客户作为追随者在阶段III选择方案。通过分析客户在不同定价方案下的决策,推导出市场均衡。然后,我们给出了RP的最优定价策略,使其利润最大化。最后,在考虑每个客户的评估和需求的情况下,我们给出了REP提供的具体计划的最优决策。分析和仿真结果均表明,在大多数情况下,一次性收费方案能使RP的利润最大化。
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Optimal Pricing Strategy for Residential Electricity Usage in Smart Grid
Electricity Retailers offer various utility plans in the hope that the increased competition would result in lower prices, improved service, and innovative product offerings. In this paper, we present the retail electric provider’s (REP) optimal pricing strategy for residential customers in smart grid, in which the REP offers multiple utility plans for customers with different needs, which includes a flat-rate plan, a multi-stage plan, and a lump-sum fee plan. The residential customers select the utility plan that maximize their own payoffs by considering their own demands and the pricing strategies of the three plans. In the other way around, the REP optimizes its profit by carefully designing its pricing strategy based on residential customers’ decisions. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider a system with one REP and a group of customers in need of electricity. We propose a three-stage Stackelberg game model, in which the REP acts as the leader who decides the specific plans to offer at Stage I, then announces the price for each plan in stage II, and finally the customers act as followers that select plans in stage III. We derive the market equilibrium by analyzing customers’ decisions among the plans under different pricing schemes. Then, we provide the RP’s optimal pricing strategies to maximize its profit. In the end, we give the optimal decisions for REP on the specific plan(s) to offer while considering each customer’s evaluation and demand. Both the analytical and simulation results show that the lump-sum fee plan can maximize RP’s profit in most cases.
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