证券交易委员会,公司治理和股东进入董事会会议室

J. Brown
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在股东治理领域,最具争议的问题之一是股东提名董事的权利,以及将被提名董事纳入管理层的委托书。本文考察了独立董事日益重要的背景下的冲突。州法律和证券交易委员会(SEC)越来越依赖独立董事来保护股东,并确保财务披露过程的完整性。然而,由于定义薄弱和执行问题,这些董事往往不是真正的独立。解决这些问题的一种方法是允许股东提名和选举他们自己的候选人。根据州法律,他们有提名的权力,但由于需要征求代理人,这一权力在很大程度上被削弱了,这是一个昂贵且耗时的过程。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)曾多次寻求修改规则,允许股东在一定程度上查阅其被提名者的公司委托书,但总是失败,第一次尝试是在1942年。这篇文章对这些努力进行了全面分析,包括最近一次在2007年的重复,当时委员会重申了其传统立场,即股东不应获得公司对被提名人的代理声明。这篇文章的立场是,在一个激进股东的时代,要求SEC改革其规则的压力将继续增加。此外,继续拒绝进入将使事情变得更糟,导致激进股东的努力更具侵入性,更有可能导致对董事会的争夺。拒绝查阅也在代理权竞争的披露机制中留下了一个严重的缺口。最后,随着证交会越来越多地参与到公司治理过程中(这是它历来不必考虑的角色),拒绝其介入引发了人们对该机构是否愿意保护股东利益的质疑。
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The SEC, Corporate Governance, and Shareholder Access to the Board Room
In the shareholder governance area, one of the most contentious issues concerns the right of shareholders to nominate directors and include the nominees in management's proxy statement. This article examines the conflict in the context of the growing importance of independent directors. State law and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have increasingly relied upon independent directors to protect shareholders and ensure the integrity of the financial disclosure process. Yet because of weak definitions and problems of enforcement, these directors are often not truly independent. One method of addressing these concerns is to allow shareholders to nominate and elect their own candidates. They have the power to nominate under state law but the authority has largely been emasculated by the need to solicit proxies, an expensive and time consuming process. The SEC has from time to time sought, always unsuccessfully, to amend the rules to allow shareholders some access to the company's proxy statement for their nominees, with the first effort taking place in 1942. The article contains a comprehensive analysis of these efforts, including the most recent iteration in 2007 when the Commission reaffirmed its traditional position that shareholders should not have access to the company's proxy statement for nominees. The article takes the position that in an era of activist shareholders, pressure on the SEC to reform its rules will continue to grow. Moreover, continued denial of access will make things worse, leading to efforts by activist shareholders that are more intrusive and more likely to result in contests for the board of directors. The denial of access also leaves in place a serious gap in the disclosure regime for proxy contests. Finally, as the SEC becomes increasingly involved in the corporate governance process, a role it has not historically had to consider, the denial of access raises questions about the agency's willingness to protect the interests of shareholders.
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