{"title":"签署协议遏制腐败","authors":"J. Ciorciari","doi":"10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyzes the possibilities for sharing authority outside the judicial sphere in order to curb corruption. It concentrates on the seminal experiment in this area: the Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia, created in 2005, which granted external actors cosigning authority with certain key Liberian officials. GEMAP was able to deliver important service benefits to Liberia during the tenure of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thus helping to justify deep international involvement in Liberia’s domestic economic affairs. The case nevertheless shows the limits of sovereignty-sharing mechanisms in implanting sustainable reforms when domestic commitment ebbs and problematic incentive structures remain.","PeriodicalId":398085,"journal":{"name":"Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cosigning to Curb Corruption\",\"authors\":\"J. Ciorciari\",\"doi\":\"10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter analyzes the possibilities for sharing authority outside the judicial sphere in order to curb corruption. It concentrates on the seminal experiment in this area: the Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia, created in 2005, which granted external actors cosigning authority with certain key Liberian officials. GEMAP was able to deliver important service benefits to Liberia during the tenure of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thus helping to justify deep international involvement in Liberia’s domestic economic affairs. The case nevertheless shows the limits of sovereignty-sharing mechanisms in implanting sustainable reforms when domestic commitment ebbs and problematic incentive structures remain.\",\"PeriodicalId\":398085,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本章分析了在司法领域之外分享权力以遏制腐败的可能性。它专注于这一领域的开创性实验:2005年创建的利比里亚治理和经济管理项目,该项目授予外部参与者与利比里亚某些关键官员的联署权。在埃伦·约翰逊·瑟利夫(Ellen Johnson Sirleaf)总统任期内,GEMAP能够为利比里亚提供重要的服务效益,从而有助于证明国际社会深入参与利比里亚国内经济事务是合理的。然而,这个案例表明,在国内承诺减弱、问题激励结构依然存在的情况下,主权分享机制在实施可持续改革方面存在局限性。
This chapter analyzes the possibilities for sharing authority outside the judicial sphere in order to curb corruption. It concentrates on the seminal experiment in this area: the Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia, created in 2005, which granted external actors cosigning authority with certain key Liberian officials. GEMAP was able to deliver important service benefits to Liberia during the tenure of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thus helping to justify deep international involvement in Liberia’s domestic economic affairs. The case nevertheless shows the limits of sovereignty-sharing mechanisms in implanting sustainable reforms when domestic commitment ebbs and problematic incentive structures remain.