法律如何改变网络:董事会联锁的社会网络分析

Moran Ofir
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文实证考察了在促进竞争和降低集中度法下,市场对金字塔结构公司增加公司治理规定的反应。具体而言,本文考察了以色列有关董事会组成的法律规定对董事会连通性强度的影响。为了进行上述审查,特别建立了两个数据库,其中包括以色列市场上50家最大上市公司董事会的详细资料。一个数据库反映《减少集中法》生效前六个月的情况,第二个数据库反映立法生效后六个月的情况。使用社会网络分析领域的方法对这些数据进行了处理和分析,以检查由于立法而在各种连接指数中发生的变化。实证分析的结果表明,在这些法律规定生效后,每个董事会的平均董事人数有所下降,董事所在公司的平均数量也有所下降。此外,在以色列的大型上市公司中,董事会联锁的连通性水平有所下降。下降的强度低于完全遵守初级和次级立法所要求的最低标准所预期的下降强度。董事之间的联系本身是复杂而密集的,但在上述监管变化之后,董事之间的联系水平也有所下降。此外,当根据公司之间的联系强度将市场划分为不同的群体时,可以看到同一公司样本中不同群体的数量增加,而群体之间的联系数量减少。
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How Law Changes Networks: A Social Network Analysis of Board Interlocks
This paper empirically examines the market's reaction to increased corporate governance provisions which were applied to pyramid-structured corporations under the Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration Law. Specifically, the paper examines the influence of legal provisions dealing with the composition of boards of directors on the intensity of board connectivity in Israel. For the purpose of said examination, two databases were specially constructed, which include detailed information regarding boards of the 50 largest publicly-traded firms in the Israeli market. One database reflects the situation six months prior to the entry of the Reduction of Concentration Law into force, and the second database reflects the situation six months after the legislation has entered into force. This data has been processed and analyzed, using methodologies from the Social Network Analysis field, in order to examine the changes that occurred in various connectivity indices as a result of the legislation. The findings of the empirical analysis show that following the entry into force of these legal provisions, the average number of directors per board has declined, and so has the average number of corporates on which sits a director. In addition, there has been a decline in the level of connectivity of the board interlocks within the large publicly-traded corporations in Israel. The intensity of the decline was lower than that which was expected under complete adherence to the minimal standard required in primary and secondary legislation. The connections between directors themselves are complex and dense, but there has also been a decline in the level of connectivity between directors following the aforementioned regulatory changes. Additionally, when dividing the market to groups based on the intensity of connections between firms, one can see an increase in the number of different groups within the same sample of firms, and a decrease in the number of connections between groups.
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