诉讼风险与自愿披露:有意义的警示语的使用

Karen K. Nelson, A. Pritchard
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引用次数: 113

摘要

本研究以1995年《私人证券诉讼改革法案》为安全港,考察公司自愿披露警示性语言的行为。我们研究了在法规下指示有意义的警示性语言的三个披露属性。与预测一致,我们发现面临更大诉讼风险的公司披露更多的警示性语言,每年更新更多的披露,并使用更可读的语言。对诉讼风险变化的反应是不对称的;当诉讼风险增加时,公司会增加警示性语言的使用,但当诉讼风险降低时,公司不会删除警示性语言。综上所述,我们的证据表明,公司采用披露政策来降低诉讼的预期成本。
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Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: The Use of Meaningful Cautionary Language
This study investigates firms' voluntary disclosure of cautionary language under the safe harbor of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We examine three disclosure attributes indicative of meaningful cautionary language under the statute. Consistent with predictions, we find that firms subject to greater litigation risk disclose more cautionary language, update the disclosure more from year-to-year, and use more readable language. The response to changes in litigation risk is asymmetric; firms increase their use of cautionary language when litigation risk increases but do not remove cautionary language when litigation risk decreases. Taken together, our evidence suggests that firms adopt disclosure policies to reduce the expected costs of litigation.
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