{"title":"心理学哲学与语义观相遇","authors":"V. Hardcastle","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192914","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"1733 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Philosophy of Psychology Meets the Semantic View\",\"authors\":\"V. Hardcastle\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192914\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when.\",\"PeriodicalId\":288090,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association\",\"volume\":\"1733 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1994-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192914\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192914","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when.