会计操纵、同业压力与内部控制

Pingyang Gao, Gaoqing Zhang
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引用次数: 60

摘要

摘要本文研究了企业在内部控制方面的投资,以减少会计操纵。我们首先表明,同级管理者的操纵决策是战略互补:一个管理者操纵……
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Accounting Manipulation, Peer Pressure, and Internal Control
ABSTRACT We study firms' investment in internal controls to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show that peer managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements: one manager manipulat...
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Weak Creditor Rights and Insider Opportunism: Evidence from an Emerging Market Target Performance Goals in CEO Compensation Contracts and Management Earnings Guidance Accounting Manipulation, Peer Pressure, and Internal Control
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